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STATE ACTION, STATE LAw, AND THE PRIVATE HosPITAL 
On March 2, 1964, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition 
to review by certiorari the decision in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp.1 By declining to review the case the Supreme Court left unaffected2 
the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that two private 
hospitals which had participated in the Hill-Burton program of federal 
hospital assistance3 were sufficiently involved with governmental action, 
both state and federal, to bring their conduct within the fifth and four-
teenth amendment prohibitions against racial discrimination.4 This deci-
1 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 84 S. Ct. 793 (1964) [hereinafter referred 
to as the principal case]. 
2 A denial of a petition for certiorari simply means that fewer than four members of 
the Court deemed it desirable to review the decision. The Court has stated that such 
a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding its views on the merits of the 
case. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950). See also Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
s Funds for federal aid for construction of hospital and related health facilities 
are made available through annual appropriations by Congress. These appropriations 
are then allocated among the states and possessions in accordance with a statutory 
formula based on population and relative per capita income of the states and possessions. 
States wishing to participate must inventory existing facilities, determine hospital con-
struction needs, and develop construction priorities according to federal standards. State 
agencies make these inventories and then adopt state-wide plans which are submitted to 
the Surgeon General of the United States for approval. Hospital Survey and Construction 
Act, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1958). 
4 The court also found that portion of the Hill-Burton Act which tolerated "separate 
but equal" facilities for separate population groups, and a regulation pursuant to that 
portion, unconstitutional. 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 29le(f) (1958); 42 
C.F.R. § 53.112 (1960). This aspect of the decision seems clearly correct under Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The 
court stated that, because the statute and regulation sanctioned unconstitutional practice, 
it was necessary to pass upon their validity in order to make the injunctive relief granted 
effective. Principal case at 969. 
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sion will probably affect all of the 3,346 private, non-profit hospitals in the 
United States and its possessions which have received federal funds for 
building ·construction under the Hill-Burton program.Ii 
In the principal case a class action was brought in a federal district 
court by a group of Negro physicians, dentists, and patients seeking to 
restrain the defendant hospitals from denying the use of staff facilities to 
Negro doctors and dentists and from refusing admittance to Negro patients. 
Both defendants were non-profit hospitals owned and governed by boards 
of trustees and duly constituted charitable corporations under state law. 
They both participated in the Hill-Burton program,6 and both discrimi• 
nated on the basis of race. The district court granted defendants' motion 
to dismiss on the ground that no "state action" was present, and denied 
the motion by the plaintiffs and the United States7 for summary judgment.8 
The plaintiffs and the United States appealed to the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, which, sitting en bane, found that there was state 
fi. Journal of the American Hospital Association, Guide Issue, Aug. 31, 1963, p. 448. As 
of June 30, 1962, there were 2,950 Hill-Burton projects approved for the 3,346 voluntary 
non-profit hospitals in the United States. Because some private hospitals have been 
engaged in more than one project, this number is somewhat larger than the number of 
such hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds; nevertheless, the approximate correlation is 
sufficiently close to indicate the vast impact of the holding in the principal case. 
As of June 30, 1962, $1,751,204,000 of federal funds was approved for 6,236 projects, the 
total cost of which was to be $5,523,280,000. Of these projects 3,286, with a total cost of 
$2,112,073,000, were publicly owned. The federal share of the cost of these projects was 
$768,937,000, or 36.4%. The hospitals which will be affected by the decision in the principal 
case are the private non-profit organizations, for there is no doubt that the activities of 
hospitals that are state or municipally owned constitute "state action." See Appendix infra, 
6 The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital had received a total of $1,269,950 of Hill-
Burton funds in connection with the construction of a diagnostic and treatment center 
and an addition to its general facilities. The Hill-Burton funds constituted approximately 
17.2% of the total cost of $7,367,023 of these two projects. The hospital is a large and 
successful one with facilities worth millions of dollars and a substantial endowment, and 
the government subsidies amounted to a very small portion of the total cost of the hospital 
facilities. 
The Wesley Long Hospital undertook three projects costing a total of $3,927,385 which 
were designed to replace its antiquated general facilities with ,modem ones, to enlarge its 
capacity from 78 to 150 beds, and to construct a laundry and a nurses' training school. 
It received $1,948,100 of Hill-Burton funds, which is approximately 49.6% of the total 
cost of these projects. The ratio of the subsidy to the total value of all of its facilities does 
not appear. Principal case at 963, 971. 
It is perhaps arguable that construction of a separate laundry or a nurses' training 
school with government funds is not adequate reason for bringing the entire hospital 
within the scope of the fourteenth amendment. This question was not raised in the 
principal case because both defendant hospitals received Hill-Burton funds for the con-
struction of general hospital facilities. However, the court did not indicate that it would 
make any distinctions with reference to the type of facilities constructed. Indeed, as long 
as the facility constructed is part of the total operations of the hospital, the hospital as a 
whole has been aided and there would seem to be no reason for such a distinction. 
7 The United States intervened because the proceeding was one in which the constitu-
tionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest was drawn in question. 28 
U.S.C. § 2403 (1958); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). . 
8 Simkins V:• Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962). 
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action, and remanded to the district -court with directions to grant injunc-
tive relief.0 
The decision in the .principal case presents a conflict between two lines 
of legal authority which, while ordinarily separate and distinct, are in this 
context confusingly intermingled. The first legal development is the ex-
pansion of the concept of state action as a federal constitutional concept, 
exemplified by the principal case. The second involves a series of state 
decisions which have firmly established that, as a matter of state law, a 
private hospital has complete discretion to determine who may use its 
facilities.10 These two lines of authority collide in the type of fact situation 
involved in the principal case, and it is therefore necessary to determine 
what effect the expansion of the concept of state action to include actions 
formerly deemed private will have upon a doctrine which has developed 
on the basis of state law with little or no regard given to possible federal 
constitutional principles. Section one of the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.11 That the four-
teenth amendment is not a limitation on private action has been considered 
settled since the Civil Rights Cases were decided in 1883.12 Three years 
before that the Court had stated that "A State acts by its legislative, its 
executive, or its judicial authorities," and that when anyone "by virtue 
of public position under a State government •.. acts in the name and for 
the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the state."18 
o Principal case at 969. 
10 Edson v. Griffen Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct. 1958); West 
Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 Iowa 
582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952); Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159 
(1942); Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. 
Ass'n, 11 N.Y.2d 205, 182 N.E.2d 393, 227 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1962); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. 
Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), afj'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 
(1925); Weary v. Baylor Univ. Hosp., 360 S.W .2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Khoury v. 
Community Memorial Hosp., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962). 
11 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fifth amendment provides that no person shall 
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
This amendment is a limitation solely upon the federal government. Barron v. Mayor 
8: City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The Constitution does not contain an equal 
protection clause applicable to the federal government. However, the due process clause, 
in serving as a restraint on arbitrary legislation, tends to secure equal protection of the 
laws. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court held that compulsory 
racial segregation in District of Columbia schools violated the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Steward Mach. 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331 (1921); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235 (1944) (dissent). 
12 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
13 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880). In a recent decision the Supreme Court, 
citing Ex parte Virginia, held that statements by a city mayor and chief of police that the 
city would not permit Negroes to seek desegregated service in restaurants were authoritative 
acts of the executive, and that the city must therefore be treated as if it had an ordinance 
prohibiting such conduct. Although it did not decide the issue, the Court indicated that 
such statements, together with the fact of previous arrests of Negroes attempting to obtain 
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If the concept of state action had been limited to the official acts of state 
officials, it would have been so easy to avoid state action that the fourteenth 
amendment would have been largely ineffectual. Thus, a problem which 
has plagued the federal courts since 1883 is the determination of when 
action by private individuals is to be deemed state action for purposes of 
the fourteenth amendment. It was not a long step from official acts of a 
state official to the unofficial acts of a state official done under "color of 
state authority.''14 Similarly, state action was found where a state official, 
although in a position to use the authority of his office to prevent action 
which resulted in a denial of due process or equal protection, failed to do 
so.15 The Supreme Court had no difficulty in finding state action where a 
private person acted in a discriminatory manner under compulsion of a 
state statute or local ordinance.16 It is only in the past two decades, however, 
that it has been recognized that there can be state action where a private 
party acts in his private capacity and without compulsion of state law. 
The initial extension of the state action concept into the area of wholly 
private activity was made in those instances where the private party was 
performing a "basic state function.''17 Next, when the state, through its 
judicial branch, enforced private discrimination, the Court found state 
action in the affirmative sanctioning of such discrimination.18 
In addition to the cases which could easily be categorized into the some-
what definitive groups mentioned above, there appeared a number of 
lower federal court cases in which state action was found which did not 
fit into any category. In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library19 state action 
such service, showed that the owner's action was coerced by the city officials. Lombard v. 
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267,278 (1963). 
14 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 
(1945). 
15 McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Catlette v. United States, 
132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943). 
16 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). In 1963 
the Supreme Court reversed criminal trespass convictions of Negroes who refused to heed 
the proprietors' orders that they leave the white sections of certain lunch counters. The 
Negroes were ordered to leave because of their race, and local ordinances required segrega-
tion of the races at such facilities. Adopting the phraseology of its holding in Burton 
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the Court stated that when a state 
has commanded a particular result, it has the power to determine that result and thereby 
has "become involved" in it "to a significant extent." Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 
248 (1963). In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963), the Court reversed 
the convictions of two ministers who had aided and abetted violation of a local criminal 
trespass ordinance by inciting sit-in demonstrations, stating that there could be no con-
viction for aiding and abetting someone to do an innocent act. 
17 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith 
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The Terry and Smith cases arose under the fifteenth 
amendment, which also requires state or federal action. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
18 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). This 
form of state action, however, has not yet been extended to its logical extremes. See Black 
v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956). See generally Comment, Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer 
on the State Action Concept, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 718 (1956). 
19 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945). 
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was found in the substantial control exerted by the city through regulatory 
requirements attached to large subsidies which it granted to the library.2~ 
The granting of government aid, however, was apparently not deemed suf-
ficient in the absence of substantial regulatory control.21 Where the Govern-
ment collusively used a private party as its agent to achieve indirectly a 
purpose which the government itself could not constitutionally achieve~ 
however, such as the leasing of public swimming pools to private parties 
to avoid integration, the discriminatory acts of these private parties were 
held acts of the state.22 Similarly, where a government undertook to pro-
vide a public service on its own property and procured a private party to 
operate the service, such as by awarding a restaurant concession in an air 
terminal, the conduct of the private party while performing this function 
was deemed to be that of the state for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment, even though the state had not intended that the service be performed 
on a discriminatory basis.23 While these decisions cannot be neatly cate-
gorized, they indicate that the lower federal courts sensed that there could 
be a private-state relationship of such a nature that the acts of the private 
party would be acts of the state for the purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment, even though there was no official state action, no formal delegation 
of state authority, and no state authorization of the discriminatory acts. 
This rather unformed and nebulous feeling was given verbal expression 
by the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.2-t Al-
though the Court declined to give a precise definition of state action,20 
it held that a state could become so substantially involved in an otherwise 
private activity that that activity would constitute state action even though 
the state neither exercised control over it nor gave it direct financial sup-
port.26 The Court refused to enunciate a precise formula for determining 
20 Id. at 219. 
21 Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hosp., 261 F.2d 524 (4th 
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959), overruled by Eaton v. Grubbs, 32 U.S.L. 
WEEK 2523 (4th Cir. April I, 1964); Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 851 
(D. Md. 1960); Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 
1957); Norris v. Mayor & City Council, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948). 
22 City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957) (the successful plaintiff-
appellee in this case was apparently the same George C. Simkins, Jr. who prevailed in the 
principal case); Department of Conservation v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956); 
Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W. Va. 1948). 
23 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Derrington v. 
Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. 
Ga. 1960). 
2-t 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
25 "[T]o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility 
under the Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible task,' which 'This Court has never 
attempted.'" Id. at 722. The Court also indicated that its decision was limited to the 
facts of the particular case. Id. at 726. However, in view of the fact that in the Peterson 
case the Court specifically quoted from Burton in framing its decision (see note 16 supra), 
it would seem that Burton may now be properly regarded as enunciating a broad rule of 
law. 
26 The Burton case involved an owner of a restaurant who leased space in a municipal 
parking structure and who was found to have violated the fourteenth amendment when 
1438 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
what constitutes sufficient involvement, and stated that only by sifting the 
facts and weighing the circumstances of each case could "nonobvious in-
volvement" of the state in private conduct be attributed its true signifi-
cance.27 The important elements of the relationship in issue in Burton 
which led the Court to find sufficient involvement of the state in the 
activities of the privately operated restaurant were the continuous relation-
ship between the parties, the interdependence and the mutual benefits 
conferred, the fact that restaurants are normally open to the general public, 
the fact that the restaurant was located in a public building and was likely 
to be associated by most people with the state, and the fact that the state 
could have prohibited the discrimination and did not do so.28 
The Burton holding placed in doubt the validity of previous lower court 
decisions in which no state action was found because the state did not ac-
tually control the actions of the private party.29 Thus, in Eaton v. Grubbs8° 
the plaintiffs who had been denied relief in Eaton v. Board of Managers of 
James Walker Memorial Hosp.81 sued the same defendant asking that the 
issue of state action be reconsidered because the previous decision had 
applied a day-to-day control test instead of considering the totality of the 
relationship. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, 
stating that Burton did not enunciate a new principle of law and that, 
as stated in Burton, each case was to be decided on its own facts.82 It 
seems difficult to deny, however, that Burton did expand the concept of 
state action to include activities which were formerly not included, and 
this view has recently received judicial approval.88 If the group of pre-
Burton cases which had found no state action despite significant state 
involvement had been decided after Burton, they probably would have 
been decided differently. Significantly, the Burton principle of considering 
the totality of the state-private relationship has been used to find state 
he excluded Negroes. The city did not encourage the discrimination, but it could have 
prohibited it in the lease. The rents were essential to the city's plan to operate the garage 
on a self-sustaining basis, and the restaurant depended on the existence of the parking 
garage to attract some customers. Also, the restaurant was operated as an integral part of 
the public building. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
21 Id. at 722. 
28 Id. at 723-25. 
29 See cases cited in note 21 supra. 
30 216 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.C. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2523 (4th Cir. April 1, 1964). 
31 261 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959). This case was over-
ruled by Eaton v. Grubbs, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2523 (4th Cir. April 1, 1964). 
32 Eaton v. Grubbs, 216 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.C. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2523 (4th 
Cir. April 1, 1964). 
33 After its decision in the principal case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
sitting en bane, reversed the decision of the district court in Eaton v. Grubbs. Relying on 
its decision in the principal case and upon Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ghioto v. Hampton, 371 U.S. 911 (1962), as well as upon 
Burton, the court stated that "a new and independent examination must be made of the 
relationship between the governmental bodies and the .•• Hospital.'' The court went on 
to find the hospital subject to the fourteenth amendment. Eaton v. Grubbs, 32 U.S.L. 
WEEK 2523 (4th Cir. April 1, 1964), reversing 216 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.C. 1963). 
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action in two recent cases where clearly there would have been none before. 
In Hampton v. City of ]acksonville,84 the court found sufficient involve-
ment to constitute state action where a city sold two public golf courses 
to private citizens with reverter to the city if they should cease to be so 
used. The city had sold the golf courses to the private parties only after 
earlier in the litigation an injunction had issued prohibiting the city from 
operating them on a racially restricted basis. Indicating that it was irrele-
vant whether there had been a collateral agreement whereby the private 
parties would continue to segregate the golf courses, the court said that 
"the only question is a legal one: Do the agreed facts compel the conclu-
sion that the operation of the golf course in the hands of the new owners 
continue to be state action within the purview of the XIV amendment?"85 
The court felt that the absolute obligation of the private parties to use the 
land only as a golf course, enforced by use of the reverter, brought the 
activity within the fourteenth amendment even though the daily operation 
was not subject to the city's direction. In Smith v. Holiday Inns36 discrimi-
nation by a private motel was held state action. The court found sufficient 
involvement because a state housing authority had cleared a slum area and 
redeveloped it, supervising the kinds of buildings constructed. When the 
land was conveyed to the private purchasers, the state authority retained 
some continuing control by means of restrictive covenants for the breach 
of which it had a right of action. 
It was on the basis of the Burton standard of analyzing the total rela-
tionship of the private party and the state that the court in the principal 
case determined that there had been sufficient involvement of the state and 
federal governments in the affairs of the defendant hospitals to constitute 
state and federal action within the fourteenth and fifth amendments. The 
involvement was found in ,the participation of defendants in the massive 
public funds available under the Hill-Burton program, the governmental 
regulations to which participating hospitals are subject, and the federal-
state sharing of a common plan for a proper allocation of available medical 
and hospital resources.s1 
34 !104 F.2d !120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub 110m. Ghioto v. Hampton, 371 U.S. 911 
(1962). In finding state action the court specifically questioned the validity of Eaton v. 
Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hosp. in the light of Burton. "Being un-
able, as we are, to find any valid distinction between the effect of the lease in the Wil-
mington Parking Authority case and the sale with a reversionary interest in the Walker 
Hospital case, we doubt whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would have 
decided the Hospital case as it did had it followed the Supreme Court decision." Id. at 32!1. 
SIi Id. at !121. 
36 220 F. Supp. I (M.D. Tenn. 196!1). 
37 The dissenting judge did not think there was sufficient involvement. He argued 
that the program was intended by Congress to be mer'ely a grant and not a regulatory 
scheme (60 Stat, 1091 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 291m (1958); Hearings on S. 191 Before the 
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1945)), that the state 
commission was not empowered to exercise any regulatory functions (see N.C. G:EN. STAT. 
§ 1!11-120 (1958)), that the regulations imposed by the statute were no more than devices 
to secure proper use of the money, and that therefore there was no state action. Principal 
case at 972-75. 
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Notwithstanding the steady expansion of the concept of state action, 
which, culminating in the principal case, has finally placed the activities 
of many private hospitals within the commands of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the overwhelming majority of state courts have firmly established that 
for state-law purposes a private hospital has complete discretion over the 
use of its facilities. Two recent cases exemplify the rationales of both the 
majority position and the minority view, held only by New Jersey. In 
Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center,38 a physician sued for reinstatement 
as a member of the courtesy staff of a hospital owned and operated by a 
private corporation, and a federal district court in the District of Columbia 
held that a private hospital may admit or exclude patients and appoint 
or remove members of its medical staff in its discretion. In Greisman v. 
Newcomb Hosp.39 an osteopathic physician sued to force a private hospital 
to consider his application for admission to its courtesy staff, but in this 
case the Supreme Cou11t of New Jersey held that a hospital, although private 
in the sense that it is non-governmental, is sufficiently imbued with a 
public aspect that it was subject to public supervision and can not exercise 
its power to admit physicians to staff membership arbitrarily or unreason-
ably. 
The majority view, as illustrated by the Shulman case, starts with the 
proposition that all hospitals are either public or private. A public hospital 
is one owned, maintained, and operated by a governmental unit and sup-
ported by government funds. A private hospital is one that is owned, main-
tained, and operated by a corporation or individual without governmental 
participation in its control.40 The distinction has typically been made in 
terms of public and private corporations. The most frequently cited for-
mulation of the distinction was made in Van Campen v. Olean Gen. 
Hosp.,41 where it was stated that a public corporation is an instrumentality 
of the state, founded and owned by the state in the public interest, sup-
ported by public funds, and governed by managers deriving their authority 
from the state, whereas a corporation organized by permission of the legis-
lature, supported largely by voluntary contributions, and managed by of-
ficers and directors who are not representatives of the state or any political 
subdivision is a private corporation, al,though engaged in charitable work.42 
The fact that a private hospital may receive donations or subventions from 
the government, or compensation for caring for indigent patients, is deemed 
to be immaterial.48 Once a hospital has established its character as a private 
institution, it is not required to accept any person who demands access to 
its facilities, "as there can be no absolute right in individuals to claim the 
ss 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963). 
39 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963). 
40 Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963). 
41 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), afl'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925). 
42 Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 178, 46 A.2d 298,300 (1946). 
43 West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Van Campen v. Olean 
Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), afl'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 
219 (1925); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962). 
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benefit of its privileges."44 It follows under the majority view, therefore, 
that if a private hospital in its discretion excludes a doctor or patient from 
the use of the facilities of the hospital, the courts are without authority to 
interfere.45 
The Greisman case is a clear statement of the New Jersey view. The 
court accepted the public corporation-private corporation distinction enun-
ciated in the Van Campen case. However, it held that a combination of 
factors may exist which imbue a private hospital with a public aspect so 
that it is subject to the state police power to regulate for the health, safety, 
and morals of the public. In Greisman the factors deemed important to 
the finding that Newcomb Hospital was imbued with a public aspect were: 
it was a non-profit organization dedicated to a vital public use; as such, it 
received tax benefits; its funds were in large part received from public 
sources and through public solicitation;46 and it exercised a virtual monop-
oly in its geographical area. Making reference to the common-law duties 
of innkeepers and carriers to serve all comers on reasonable terms47 and 
the statutory obligations imposed upon private businesses such as ware-
houses, insurance companies, and milk distributors,48 the court pointed out 
that a state may "upon proper occasion . . . regulate a business in any of 
its aspects .... "4° Conceding that hospital officials must be vested with a 
large measure of discretion in managing a private hospital, the court stated 
that they must remember that such hospitals are operated for the benefit 
of the public,50 and that courts would be remiss if they did not intervene 
where that discretion is exercised in a manner unrelated to sound hospital 
standards and not in furtherance of the common good.51 
Although the opinions of the courts following the majority view fail 
to make it totally clear,52 it is apparent that when they speak of the ab-
44 Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 62 (D.D.C. 1963); Levin 
v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 180, 46 A.2d 298, !101 (1946); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 
210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), afl'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925). 
45 See cases cited note IO supra. 
46 The cost of a new building for the defendant hospital had been borne by public 
subscription, it had received local funds for caring for indigents, it had received charitable 
contributions from the Ford Foundation and other similar organizations, and it was 
eligible for Hill-Burton funds. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. !189, !192, 192 A.2d 
817, 818 (196!1). 
47 E.g., Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47, 50, 148 A.2d l, 2 (1959); 
Messenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., !16 N.J.L. 407 (Sup. Ct. 187!1), afl'd, !17 N.J.L. 5!11 (Ct. Err. 
&: App. 1874). 
48 E.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (19!14); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 
2!1!1 U.S. !189 (1914); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 11!1 (1876). 
40 Nebbia v. New York, supra note 47, at 5!16-!17. 
50 Supporting this point of view that private corporations serving the public have 
higher duties than ordinary private corporations is the virtually unanimous rule that such 
corporations cannot contract away their liability for negligence. See Tunkl v. Regents of 
the Univ. of Calif., !12 Cal. Rptr. !Ill, !18!1 P.2d 441 (Cal. 196!1). 
51 The court also relied heavily upon a prior decision in Falcone v. Middlesex County 
Medical Soc'y, !14 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961), in which it had declared invalid an 
arbitrary membership requirement of a county medical society. Greisman v. Newcomb 
Hosp., 40 N.J. !189, !199-40!1, 190 A.2d 817, 822-24 (1963). 
52 An exception is West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 29!1 (Fla. 195!1). 
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solu~e discretion of the managing officials of a hospital they do not mean 
that this discretion could not be subjected :to control by the legislature 
under the state police power. Thus, the real distinction between the 
majority and minority views would seem to be that the majority view 
holds that the legislature alone can exercise control over private hospital 
management, while the New Jersey court holds this to be a proper judicial 
function. 63 ' 
Although the rule adopted in New Jersey and the rule set forth in the 
principal case overlap jn the sense that both may be applicable to a single 
situation, they are nevertheless separate and distinct. Different factual 
prerequisites are necessary to invoke the two rules, and the consequences 
of their application are different. The New Jersey court in Greisman indi-
cated that the crucial element was the public aspect of the hospital,H 
whereas the court of appeals in the principal case was looking for govern-
mental involvement in the activities of the hospital.1515 In finding a public 
aspect, the New Jersey court emphasized the non-profit, charitable nature 
of the hospital and the fact that it received a large portion of its funds 
from a governmental source or from public solicitation of private persons.l'i6 
To find sufficient governmental involvement, however, the court in the 
principal case stressed the control exerted by the government over the 
hospital, the large amount of government funds involved, and the participa-
tion of the hospital in a nationwide plan for allocation of hospital facil-
ities. 57 Also, to the New Jersey court the fact that the defendant was the 
only hospital in the area and thus had a virtual monopoly was very 
important.58 Under the reasoning of the principal case this factor would 
be irrelevant. Having found that a particular hospital is imbued with a 
public aspect, a court in New Jersey may, in the exercise of the state 
police power, exert extensive control over the discretion of the hospital 
authorities.'59 This is not true under the rule of the principal case; if there 
is governmental involvement sufficient to constitute state action, the court 
may only prohibit the hospital authorities from exercising their discretion 
so as to deny to anyone due process of law or the equal protection of the 
53 Even courts adhering to the majority view concede that courts may properly review 
claims of arbitrary exclusion that are brought against public hospitals. E.g., Ware v. 
Bendikt, 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234 (1955); Stribling v. Jolly, 241 Mo. App. 1123, 253 
S.W.2d 519 (1953); Alpert v. Board of Governors, 286 App. Div. 542, 145 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1955). 
54 Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 397-404, 192 A.2d 817, 821-25 (1963). 
55 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 960 (4th Cir. 1963). 
56 Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 396, 192 A.2d 817, 821 (1963). 
57 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 1963). 
58 Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 402, 192 A.2d 817, 824 (1963). 
59 For example, the court could, under the state police power, regulate the prices 
charged by the hospital if it felt they were so exorbitant as to deprive persons of proper 
medical care. See cases cited in note 46 supra; cf. Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 
436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963), where the New Jersey court declared invalid a statute requiring 
approval of th_e state medical society before a medical insurance company could be 
licensed to do business in the state where the membership of the medical society inter-
locked with the membership of the board of directors of the only medical insurance 
company in existence in New Jersey. 
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laws. The extent of judicial control over the hospital authorities is 
thus substantially narrower than that permitted under the New Jersey !llle. 
Considering the state cases60 in conjunction with the principal case, it 
is necessary to realize that the state cases have been decided on the basis 
of state law concerning the rights and privileges of corporations;61 the 
rights and duties of the parties under the federal constitution were not 
considered. However, as illustrated by the principal case and the Hampton. 
and Holiday Inns decisions, the principle of Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority is broad and capable of a variety of applications. Consequently, 
an application of the Burton test to the facts of many of the state-law cases 
would have resulted in finding state action. Any time the activities of a 
hospital, which under state law is a private hospital, are found to corisijtute 
state action, the right-privilege distinction on which the state cases have 
turned, although still relevant for purposes of state law, would no longer 
matter; whether admission to the facilities of a private hospital is a right 
or a privilege under state law is irrelevant to whether there is a protectible 
interest under federal constitutional law. It is true that in Hayman v. 
Galveston62 the Supreme Court of the United States held that use of 
hospital facilities is a privilege and not a constitutional right. However, in 
virtually every case where a claim of discriminatory exclusion or expulsion 
is brought against a private hospital, whether by a physician or a patient, 
the basis of the claim will be action which was arbitrary or unreasonable. 
If the claimant had attained some sort of permanent position in the hos-
pital before the complained of action occurred, such as having been ap-
pointed to the medical staff, he could rightfully claim that he had· been 
deprived of a valuable interest, cognizable as property, without due process 
of law. However, if the court refused to consider that interest as property 
or if the claimant had merely been excluded, he could justly claim that an 
arbitrary and irrational standard had been applied, depriving him of the 
equal protection of the laws. Thus, whether he has a right or merely a 
privilege he will have an interest protectible under the fourteenth amend-
ment, and the only purpose of the right-privilege distinction will be to 
determine whether the claimant is entitled to relief under the due process 
or the equal protection clause.63 • 
60 Henceforth the state cases will be considered without regard to the split of authority. 
If a plaintiff in New Jersey proceeds under state law and the actions complained of are 
found to be arbitrary, the suit will be decided on the basis of state law. If the actions are 
found not to be arbitrary under state law, the fourteenth amendment will have the same 
ramifications as in all majority jurisdictions. 
61 Occasionally a state court will confuse matters by citing Hayman v. Galveston, 273 
U.S. 414 (1927), in reaching its decision according to state law. That case held that use of 
hospital facilities is a privilege, not a constitutional right, although it might be a denial 
of equal protection if a public hospital arbitrarily excluded persons from the use of its 
facilities. See Edson v. Griffen Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct. ~958). 
02 273 U.S. 414 (1927). 
03 The right-privilege distinction is important in situations where a plaintiff is not 
able to argue that he had •been denied equal protection of the laws, but can .only claim 
that he has been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law: In such 
situations the idea that a privilege once granted may sometimes be protected under the 
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The key question, therefore, is whether there is sufficient state action 
to bring the conduct of the private hospital within the prohibitions of the 
fourteenth amendment.64 In many situations the question will be answered 
by the principal case, which, while following the Burton approach of 
examining the total relationship, extends its outer limits by expanding 
the notion of what constitutes sufficient involvement. This extension is 
not a disturbing one, however, for when a substantial amount of public 
funds is granted to a private organization to aid it in its performance of 
a public service it would be inequitable if that service were not available 
to everyone on an equal basis.65 In Cooper v. Aaron66 the Supreme Court 
emphatically stated that state support of segregated schools "through any 
arrangement, management, funds or property could not be squared with 
the fourteenth amendment."67 This principle ought to apply with equal 
force to any other public function performed by a private organization, 
and it certainly is appropriate to a function so basic to the existence of the 
state as the preservation of the health of the public.68 Furthermore, since 
state support of unreasonable discrimination cannot be squared with the 
fourteenth amendment, it is all the more distasteful when, in violation of 
the fifth amendment, the federal government, through such programs as 
the Hill-Burton Act, indirectly supports discrimination. By striking down 
an instance of discrimination in which both state and federal governments 
were involved, the decision in the principal case has taken an important 
step in making the guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 
realities for persons unreasonably denied the use of private hospital facil-
• • 69 
ities. Mary Mandana Long 
fourteenth amendment would be of significance. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 
350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952). In many of the 
state cases the plaintiffs were asking for reinstatement of a privilege previously held rather 
than the granting of a new privilege. The notion that a privilege once granted may not be 
taken away without due process, however, is not mentioned in any of the private hospital 
cases. It was recognized in Alpert v. Board of Governors, 286 App. Div. 542, 145 N.Y.S.2d 
534 (1955), which involved a public hospital. 
64 Or else sufficient federal action to bring it within the fifth amendment. 
65 Cf. Steir v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959). 
66 358 U.S. I (1958). 
67 Id. at 19. 
68 Cf. cases cited in note 17 supra. 
69 The extension of judicial control over the activities of private hospitals would be 
complete if a proposition analogous to that advocated by Judge Skelly Wright in relation 
to higher education were adopted. In Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. 
Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962), Judge Wright granted on other grounds the motion of Negro 
plaintiffs who sought admission to Tulane, but pointed out that, in view of the great 
public interest in education and the fact that private colleges perform a public function, 
there is no school or college so "private" as to escape the reach of the fourteenth amend• 
ment. After Judge Wright was transferred to the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, however, a motion for a new trial was granted by his successor on the ground 
that summary judgment was inappropriate because the question of "substantial" involve-
ment is a matter of degree and must be tried on the merits. 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La. 
1962), afj'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962). Upon retrial it was held that private universities 
and colleges are not subject to the fourteenth amendment prohibitions. 212 F. Supp. 674 
(E.D. :ta. 1962). 
APPENDIX 
The following table shows the number of voluntary non-profit hospital projects, the 
total cost, the federal share of the cost, and the percentage of the total cost which is paid 
for by federal funds on a state-by-state basis: 
Federal Share as 
Number of Cost (in thousands of dollars) Percentage of 
State Projects Total Federal Share Total Cost 
Alabama 39 $ 47,005 $ 22,411 47.6 
Alaska IO 8,648 2,411 27.9 
Arizona 38 29,605 9,178 31.0 
Arkansas 26 25,888 13,751 53.3 
California 100 169,625 42,255 24.9 
Colorado 39 51,908 11,971 23.1 
Connecticut 80 82,599 11,381 13.8 
Delaware 9 7,705 1,727 24.1 
District of Columbia 16 16,597 3,746 22.6 
Florida 56 55,505 16,745 30.2 
Georgia 18 16,547 6,264 37.8 
Hawaii 12 11,397 4,294 37.6 
Idaho 20 8,645 2,669 30.9 
Illinois 126 221,798 47,535 21.4 
Indiana 50 76,191 21,615 28.4 
Iowa 63 64,425 19,668 28.3 
Kansas 46 49,784 14,035 28.1 
Kentucky 51 48,303 23,056 47.8 
Louisiana 40 41,905 14,833 35.3 
Maine 50 35,164 12,096 34.4 
Maryland 55 97,927 17,718 18.1 
Massachusetts 142 157,901 32,225 20.4 
Michigan 103 117,062 35,232 30.1 
Minnesota 56 64,991 18,916 29.1 
Mississippi 15 11,245 5,955 53.6 
Missouri 62 93,592 30,793 32.9 
Montana 35 16,590 5,387 32.5 
Nebraska 56 44,383 12,124 27.2 
Nevada 6 3,200 1,221 38.1 
New Hampshire 49 26,304 8,540 32.5 
New Jersey 75 104,774 25,273 24.1 
New Mexico 30 19,117 6,793 35.5 
New York 187 318,925 77,592 24.4 
North Carolina 132 75,249 31,076 41.3 
North Dakota 44 25,292 8,337 33.0 
Ohio 130 177,242 45,901 26.0 
Oklahoma 61 39,515 13,539 34.2 
Oregon 57 43,391 12,599 29.0 
Pennsylvania 205 328,081 92,450 28.2 
Rhode Island 41 48,736 7,480 15.4 
South Dakota 25 10,143 5,111 50.6 
South Carolina 44 21,493 7,828 36.4 
Tennessee 37 32,813 13,326 40.5 
Texas 108 147,770 41,709 34.9 
Utah IO 8,840 3,397 38.5 
Vermont 27 19,301 6,692 34.6 
Virginia 77 91,327 35,995 39.4 
Washington 46 56,030 14,791 36.4 
West Virginia 25 40,556 16,635 40.8 
Wisconsin 95 88,586 28,868 32.6 
Wyoming 3 1,478 517 34.5 
Puerto Rico 13 10,609 6,606 62.3 
U.S. and Possessions 
Total 2,950 $3,411,307 $982,267 28.8 
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